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The (Co-)Location Sharing Game
Abstract: Most popular location-based social networks,
such as Facebook and Foursquare, let their (mobile)
users post location and co-location (involving other
users) information. Such posts bring social benefits to
the users who post them but also to their friends who
view them. Yet, they also represent a severe threat to
the users’ privacy, as co-location information introduces
interdependences between users. We propose the first
game-theoretic framework for analyzing the strategic
behaviors, in terms of information sharing, of users of
OSNs. To design parametric utility functions that are
representative of the users’ actual preferences, we also
conduct a survey of 250 Facebook users and use con-
joint analysis to quantify the users’ benefits of sharing
vs. viewing (co)-location information and their prefer-
ence for privacy vs. benefits. Our survey findings expose
the fact that, among the users, there is a large variation,
in terms of these preferences. We extensively evaluate
our framework through data-driven numerical simula-
tions. We study how users’ individual preferences influ-
ence each other’s decisions, we identify several factors
that significantly affect these decisions (among which,
the mobility data of the users), and we determine sit-
uations where dangerous patterns can emerge (e.g., a
vicious circle of sharing, or an incentive to over-share) –
even when the users share similar preferences.
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1 Introduction
With the advent of mobile networking, mobile users can
easily connect to the Internet and determine their ac-
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tual locations with their smartphones, while on the go.
Major online social network (OSN) providers, such as
Facebook, understood early on the interest users have in
sharing their location jointly, with their posts, pictures,
etc. This location-sharing feature has gained even more
momentum as users increasingly access their favorite
OSNs from their smartphones (most Facebook check-
ins and photos are made from mobile devices). Another
popular feature, currently implemented in many mobile
location-based social networks, is the ability to mention
other users, such as friends, in posts or to tag them
on pictures. Ilia et al. [24] perform a user study that
demonstrates that 84.7% of posted pictures contain one
or more face(s), whereas 87% contain one tag (users do
not typically tag themselves) and 12.2% contain more
than one tag. In many cases, such information indicates
that the users mentioned in a post are co-located. As
for location information, sharing co-location informa-
tion – the fact that two users are together (the actual
location might not be known) – brings social benefits
(as also pointed out by Krasnova et al. [29]) to those
sharing it but also to their friends who view it: Users
enjoy knowing with whom their friends are and telling
their friends with whom they are. Yet, these features
also raise privacy concerns. Although it has been known
for years that location information leads to severe pri-
vacy issues – this has been extensively studied in the
literature (e.g., [15, 30, 40]; see also FindYou [52], a lo-
cation privacy auditing tool, available at https://find-
you.herokuapp.com/) – and location privacy risks have
also been studied in the context of proximity detection
(e.g., finding nearby friends in OSNs) [35, 44, 69, 70],
it was only recently that the effect of co-location infor-
mation on users’ location privacy was studied [41]. A
critical aspect of co-locations is that they relate to all
the involved users (such information is co-owned by the
involved users [19, 57]) and introduce interdependences
between the users’ location privacy, as the location in-
formation disclosed by users affects the privacy of their
friends. As such, users lose partial control over their
privacy and it becomes complex to evaluate the optimal
sharing behavior. Such interdependent privacy risks are
quite problematic if users have different, possibly oppo-
site, views about sharing and privacy: it creates so-called
multi-party privacy conflicts [57, 58]. Awareness about
the interdependent nature of privacy is increasing, yet,
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due to its complexity, this is not explicitly addressed
by current laws. Opinion 5/2009 on online social net-
working produced by the Working Party on Data Pro-
tection, which is an advisory board set up by the EU for
the reform of the data protection laws, raises awareness
about the case of users uploading data about others.
Yet, even in the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) (Regulation EU 2016/679) which became en-
forceable on 25 May 2018, the case where individuals
share data about individuals online is not directly men-
tioned, and the problem remains unsolved. Therefore,
from a legal perspective, there are few regulations that
apply to sharing on OSNs (except for the extreme case of
sharing sexually explicit content, namely revenge porn)
and this serious problem deserves further study.
We propose the first unified framework for modeling
the direct and indirect benefits, and the privacy impli-
cations of location and co-location sharing, in addition
to the resulting strategic behaviors of the users. Such a
framework enables us to analyze the behavior of users
regarding location and co-location sharing on OSNs. To
this end, we build our framework by using two well-
established modeling and analytical tools: game the-
ory [18, 39, 60] and conjoint analysis [20]. Game theory
enables us to model and formalize the users’ sharing ra-
tionale and behavior. Such models include a number of
parameters that, typically in the expression of the users’
utility, characterize the users’ behaviors. Conjoint anal-
ysis enables us to rigorously quantify, based on a per-
sonalized user survey, the relative benefits of sharing
and viewing location and co-location information, and
the associated relative costs in terms of location privacy.
The values obtained through conjoint analysis are used
to derive the different parameters of the game-theoretic
model. Although several works [10, 45] have investigated
interdependent privacy risks from a game-theoretic per-
spective (especially in the context of Facebook applica-
tions), this is the first work that investigates the strate-
gic aspects of (co)-location sharing in the presence of
interdependent privacy risks. Our framework could typ-
ically be used to gain insight into users’ sharing be-
havior but also to design appropriate incentive mecha-
nisms and location-sharing features. Our contributions
are as follows. We identify the important problem of lo-
cation sharing with interdependent privacy risks (intro-
duced by co-location). And we propose the first game-
theoretic framework to formalize it, namely the Sharing
Game. Following a conjoint analysis approach, we design
and conduct a user survey of Facebook users (N=250)
to quantify users’ preferences of (1) sharing or view-
ing posts, (2) location or co-location information, and
(3) location privacy or sharing benefits. Our survey re-
sults indicate that, interestingly, there is no consensus
regarding users’ preferences; for instance, some users
prefer sharing location information and others prefer
sharing co-location information. We evaluate our ana-
lytical framework through simulations, in a number of
key experimental setups and scenarios and on a real
dataset, Geolife [72]. We use values of the parameters
derived from the empirical data, avoiding the pitfalls of
purely theoretical results, for a better understanding of
realistic human behaviors. Our simulations unravel sit-
uations where users can be forced into a vicious circle of
sharing their information or encouraged to over-share.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we survey the related work. In Section 3, we
describe the considered setting and the system model,
including the users and the adversary, as well as the
proposed framework for studying users’ sharing behav-
iors. In Section 4, we describe the methodology and the
results of the survey of Facebook users in order to esti-
mate the key parameters of our model. In Section 5, we
evaluate our framework in a number of scenarios. We
present an extended model in Section 6. In Section 7,
we discuss directions for improvement and extension of
our work. Finally, in Section 8, we conclude the paper
and we discuss future work.
2 Related Work
Our work is related to two broad research areas.
Information Sharing on OSNs. Users share
large amounts of information, including location, co-
location and photos, with their friends on OSNs; this
comes with privacy risks. Laufer et al. [33, 34] coined
the term privacy calculus; it consists in a psychologi-
cal framework formalizing users’ decision making pro-
cess through a cost-benefit analysis when sharing in-
formation. However, deciding whether to share infor-
mation (and the precision at which the information is
shared) is a complex process. It involves many factors
including the users’ contexts, the visibility of the shared
information (i.e., who has access to it and the rela-
tionship between the user who shares the information
and the users or the service providers who can access
it [42, 50, 59, 64]), the shared information itself, and
the benefits and privacy risks [62] associated with shar-
ing. In some cases, the happiness of a user’s friends also
becomes part of the decision process; this is usually cap-
tured through a so-called altruistic factor, as introduced
in [36] and experimentally measured using techniques
based on conjoint analysis in [46, 47]. Conjoint anal-
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ysis studies were also used to quantify the value that
users attribute to their friends’ information in the con-
text of app adoption (e.g., in [48]). In practice, deciding
whether to share information often comes down to find-
ing a sweet spot between privacy and benefits [71]. The
decision process can be automated by (1) maximizing
privacy under benefits (service quality) constraints [55]
(or conversely), (2) taking a game-theoretic approach
for modeling the interplay between the users and the
adversaries [54], or (3) by mimicking the users’ shar-
ing decisions using machine-learning techniques, after
a training phase [11]. In our work, we model decision
making as the optimization of a utility function that
incorporates both benefits and privacy. One of our con-
tributions is to parametrize this function by applying
conjoint analysis on user data collected through a tar-
geted survey. Also, as users’ decisions affect those of
other users, we follow a game-theoretic approach for
modeling the interplay between users and, ultimately,
their decisions.
Interdependent Privacy & Game Theory. The
notion of interdependent privacy, i.e., how actions per-
formed by one user affect the privacy of another, was
first formalized by Biczók and Chia [10]. Interdepen-
dent privacy raises the following concern: A user’s pri-
vacy is no longer under her sole control. Numerous
real-life examples of interdependent privacy risks were
studied in the literature, including information about
users’ friends accessed by Facebook apps [10, 45], sen-
sitive attributes inferred from those of a users’ friends
on OSNs [6, 16, 37], demographic information inferred
from a user’s interests [12], genomic data inferred from
that of relatives [8, 22], location leaked from geo-tagged
pictures that friends upload online [21], relationships
inferred from pictures [56] or mobility profiles [5], and
co-locations detected from the users’ IP address at
hotspots [61] or reported on OSNs [41]. From a social
perspective, a large body of work has been devoted to
the study of users’ individual and collaborative coping
mechanisms for multi-party privacy conflicts related to
co-owned data (also referred to as regulation of inter-
personal boundaries) [9, 13, 14, 25, 31, 57, 58, 65, 68].
These works focus mostly on the case of photo shar-
ing on online social platforms and take an experimental
and empirical approach to the problem,i.e., they rely
on interviews and surveys. Misra et al. [38] propose
a personal agent that recommends personalized access
control decisions; Fogues et al. [17] propose a machine-
learning-based policy recommender to predict the opti-
mal sharing policy in multiuser scenarios. Game theory
is a first class candidate tool for studying the interac-
tions between users who are subject to interdependent
privacy risks, as it enables the modeling of the effect of
users’ strategies on other users’ utility, as well as the
users’ decision making process. It was successfully used
to analyze users’ application adoption behaviors [10, 45],
the dynamics of individuals’ privacy preferences regard-
ing shared content [49], and privacy decision-making [2],
such as sharing genomic data [23]. The study of inter-
dependent privacy risks from an economic perspective
follows the long line of research on interdependent se-
curity games surveyed in [32]. Our work is the first to
study the interactions between OSN users in the case
of (co-)location sharing, where shared co-locations cre-
ate interdependent privacy risks. Unlike in the game-
theoretic approaches surveyed above, in our framework
we take into account the time dimension, future consid-
erations, incomplete information, and an altruistic fac-
tor. In addition, we rely on a rigorous approach, based
on user surveys, to determine realistic values of the dif-
ferent parameters of our model.
3 System Model & Formalization
We consider a mobile location-based online social net-
work (OSN) with standard sharing features. Users are
mobile and located within a given geographical region
of interest (typically a city) and time is discrete. At
some point in time, t, by checking-in at a given loca-
tion, a user can post information about her location on
her OSN profile. She can also post co-location informa-
tion by tagging a close friend in a picture, or in a status
update, thus making this information available to the
OSN provider, all her friends and all her tagged friend’s
friends. In turn, a tagged user can “un-tag” herself from
a post in which she is tagged, making this information
unavailable to all users but not to the OSN provider.
Sharing brings not only social benefits, but also loca-
tion privacy implications, for both the user who shared
the information and her tagged friend. At any time t,
an adversary – either the service provider or the friends
of one or both of these two users – has access to some of
the previously reported locations and co-locations and
can use this information to infer the users’ locations at
time t. We propose a framework in which, at any time,
the decision to post (co-)location information, and the
decision to allow a friend to post co-location informa-
tion, is made strategically by both the users involved.
While users might act irrationally, especially when
it comes to privacy-related decisions [4], this is still an
active research topic. For instance, a recent result by
Redmiles et al. [51] shows that users can actually make
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rational decisions in the context of adopting optional se-
curity behavior. We believe that privacy-protection de-
mand will increase, notably because a growing number
of people suffer the consequences of their (and others’)
carelessness. Furthermore, smartphones are increasingly
involved in the sharing decisions users make, as demon-
strated by the growing sophistication of the apps’ per-
mission systems. A tool run for this purpose can be ’ra-
tional’ and strictly follow the parametrization provided
by its user to aid him in decision making. It is there-
fore of interest to investigate what happens under the
assumption of rationality.
3.1 User Model
We model the interactions between a user and one of her
friends (also called players) as a game, called the Shar-
ing Game, over a time window of interest ({1, . . . , T}).
The adversary, with respect to whom the users’ privacy
is evaluated (typically the service provider), is not a
player of the game. We denote by a(t) = (ai(t), aj(t))
the users’ (denoted by i and j) actual locations at time
t. A potential strategy of user i at time t is denoted
by si(t) and s(t) , (si(t), sj(t)) denotes a strat-
egy profile. si(t) is chosen from the combinations of
possibilities to share or not to share her own location
and her possible co-location with her friend. We denote
si(t) , (sli(t), sci(t)), where sli(t) and sci(t) are binary
variables that represent whether user i shares location
and co-location, respectively. For alternate more com-
pact notations, we use L¯ for sli(t) = 0, L for sli(t) = 1,
C¯ for sci(t) = 0 and C for sci(t) = 1. When the two play-
ers are co-located, each of them can choose any combi-
nation of the four possible strategies: L¯C¯–sharing noth-
ing, L¯C–sharing only the co-location information, LC¯–
sharing only the location information or LC–sharing
both. Yet, when the users are not co-located they can
only choose whether to share their own location, choos-
ing between two possible strategies: L¯C¯–sharing nothing
and LC¯–sharing location information. At each time in
the windows of interest, both users choose their equi-
libria strategies–denoted by s∗(t) , (s∗i (t), s∗j (t)). In-
formation that the users share becomes available to an
adversary: their actual locations at times at which they
choose L and the fact that they are co-located at times
they choose C. For a time t, we denote by o(t − 1) the
information that the adversary observes up to time t−1
(we consider that the adversary observes information at
k ∈ {0, . . . , t − 1} time instants up to t − 1). This set
depends on both players’ equilibria decisions up to time
t− 1 and is empty for k = 0 and t = 1. The information
that the adversary observes at time t depends on s(t).
User i’s social benefits that correspond to a strat-
egy profile s(t) at time t are denoted by Bi (t,a(t), s(t)).
Note that the benefit function takes into account (i) the
time t to reflect the fact that check-ins at different times
can have different meanings, (ii) both users’ locations
at time t to reflect the fact that some locations can be
more interesting to share or view than others (e.g., a ho-
tel versus a park), (iii) who the other user is to reflect
the fact that some co-locations can be more interesting
to share than others, and (iv) both of the users’ strate-
gies, to reflect the benefit of sharing and that of viewing
information shared by her friend. Her privacy at t, de-
noted by P (i, t,a(t),o(t− 1), s(t),Bi,Bj), is a function
of (i) both users’ actual location at t, (ii) the information
observed by the adversary at the last k time instants
up to t − 1–this depends on both users’ strategies at
those time instants, (iii) their strategy profile at t, and
(iv) background user information (denoted by Bi,Bj),
e.g., their mobility profiles. We emphasize that the pri-
vacy function takes into account previous time instants.
In other words, a decision to disclose information at time
t has privacy implications at later time instants. Due to
the dependency introduced by co-locations, the privacy
function also takes into account decisions made by the
other user, and the related background information.
Naturally, the information that a user has about the
adversary’s background knowledge of herself and of the
other user, and her information about the other user’s
past or current locations, social benefits or privacy pref-
erences, could be limited. These factors would influence
her computation of her own privacy and of the other’s
privacy and social benefits. Some of these factors could
be estimated (e.g., by completing surveys to compute
their preference factors) and voluntarily shared among
players (for instance through the service provider, in
a private way). In the decision-making process, play-
ers can be assisted by a tool for evaluating the privacy
implications, namely the value P (·), of each of the play-
ers’ possible decisions regarding sharing. For instance,
a Facebook client could compute this and suggest play-
ers’ optimal decisions, using the information regarding
users’ locations and preferences in the computation of
the game’s equilibria. Another option is that such in-
formation about the friend is unknown and the players
(i.e., their local tool) must estimate it or build proba-
bilistic models of it. For the sake of keeping our model
easy to understand, we consider the first option here;
we also consider only immediate privacy implications in
the users’ estimation of the privacy (users were shown to
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often become “privacy myopic” and opt for immediate
gratification in the context of their privacy decisions [1]);
last, we assume players to be selfish. We present a model
relaxing all of these assumptions in Section 6.
At any time instant t, a player’s social benefits are
computed as a normalized sum of the benefits of sharing
information (i.e., location and co-location) and viewing
information shared by her friend, specifically,
Bi (t,a(t), s(t)) = (1)
bisl(·)sli(t) + bisc(·)sci(t) + bivl(·)slj(t) + bivc(·)scj(t)
bisl(·) + bisc(·) + bivl(·) + bivc(·)
where bisl(·) and bisc(·) denote user i’s benefit of sharing
location and co-location, and bivl(·) and bivc(·) her bene-
fit of viewing location and co-location. Note that these
benefits take into account the parameters of Bi(·) and
it is possible that they are correlated, e.g., if user i has
a large value of bisl(.), she might also have a large value
of bisc(.). The utility of player i for some strategy profile
s(t) captures both her social benefits and her privacy.
Ui (t,a(t),o(t− 1), s(t),Bi,Bj) = (1− αi) · (2)
Bi (t,a(t), s(t)) + αi · P (i, t,a(t),o(t− 1), s(t),Bi,Bj)
where αi ∈ [0, 1] denotes the weight with which user i
values her privacy over her social benefits. This formula-
tion follows a privacy calculus approach [33, 34] under a
pragmatic user model, as classified by Westin [63]. The
choice of a linear model follows previous work (e.g., Ac-
quisti [1]). The game is played successively, at time in-
stants from 1 to T . At every time instant, we model the
interactions as a perfect and complete information, non-
cooperative extensive-form game. This type of game cor-
responds to the interactions in a typical OSN, where the
players’ actions at some instant are inherently sequen-
tial: The second player (or her application implementing
the decision model) knows the choice of the first player
and decides (or suggests to the player) her strategy ac-
cordingly. Therefore, we consider that the players’ ac-
tions are ordered at every time instant. In reality, play-
ers would play such a game successively over time (re-
acting to each other’s sharing actions), hence our choice
of the model. Note that this asymmetry between players
can influence the outcome of the game.
We list our assumptions that model the existing
OSNs’ interfaces: (1) Location posts of a player are vis-
ible to all her friends and to the SP. (2) Co-location
posts initiated by either of the players are visible to the
SP and cannot be removed (even if the second player
removes them, the service provider still has access to
this information). (3) For a co-location post to be visi-
ble to friends of the two players, both of them have to
agree to share it, in which case it is visible to the union
of their friends. (4) If a player un-shares a co-location
shared by the first player (by un-tagging or even ask-
ing it to be removed), the first player cannot share that
co-location again. (5) Decisions made by the players are
fixed. Once they strategically choose the best decisions
at time t, they will not revisit them at later times.
3.2 Adversarial Models
Players’ privacy always depends on the adversary: For
the same strategy profile, different adversaries have ac-
cess to all or only some of the shared information. We
consider four possible adversaries, specifically the ser-
vice provider and three different sets of users, essen-
tially subsets of the players’ friends. Note that these are
all adversaries that our survey participants report being
concerned about and we considered the adversaries and
the information that is available to them for the typical
default privacy settings for OSN posts.
Service Provider Adversarial Model (SP).
The service provider adversary has access to all loca-
tion and co-location posts made by the players. The
specificity of this adversary is that, once either of the
players shares information, this information is always
known to him. In other words, the second player cannot
un-share co-location information with respect to the ser-
vice provider. We assume that the SP does not gather
location information about its users through other chan-
nels, such as their IP address.
Friends Adversarial Models (MF, FF, CF).
In these adversarial models, privacy is computed from
the perspective of the players’ friends. The common
point of these models is that, unlike the SP model, the
co-location information potentially shared by the first
player can be removed by the second one. We consider
three different subsets of the friends, based on the in-
formation available to each of them, as illustrated in
Figure 10: (i) “My other friends model” (MF) – this
adversary has access to all the location posts made by
the player and to co-location posts made by both play-
ers; (ii) “My friend’s other friends model” (FF) – this
adversary has access to all the location and co-location
posts made by the other player and to co-location posts
made by the player; and (iii) “Our friends in common
model” (CF) – this adversary has access to all location
and co-location posts made by both players. Note that
the FF adversary can also be representative (with a pos-
sibly higher value for α·) for a public adversary–though
this is not the default visibility for posts, users can post
information with public visibility.
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We emphasize that the action of un-tagging is not
a strategy in our game. Yet, it is modelled in differ-
ent ways: In the FF, CF and MF models, un-tagging is
equivalent to the strategies that do not share co-location
(C¯) – these adversaries can no longer see the co-location;
in the SP model, un-tagging has no effect – the SP has
access to all the information shared by either player.
3.3 Analysis Methodology
At each time instant t, we use backward induction, a
typical method for finding a subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium (SPNE) that dictates the players’ decisions. Ob-
servations made by the adversary at prior time instants,
stemming from the players’ equilibria decisions, are used
when computing the privacy of the players.
The first player, player i, anticipates the second
player’s (player j’s) best response, as a function of her
possible strategies si, essentially
∀si, s∗j (si) = arg max
s
Uj (t,a(t),o(t− 1), (si, s) ,Bi,Bj)
This eliminates incredible outcomes that player j
would never rationally choose. Player i chooses her best
strategy out of the remaining outcomes, as follows
s∗i = arg max
s
Ui
(
t,a(t),o(t− 1), (s, s∗j (s)) ,Bi,Bj)
The equilibrium decisions at time t are given by
s∗(t) =
(
s∗i , s
∗
j (s∗i )
)
We define social welfare, at time t, as the sum of the
players’ utilities, for any strategy profile, specifically
SW (t, s∗(t)) = Ui (t,a(t),o(t− 1), s∗(t),Bi,Bj) +
Uj (t,a(t),o(t− 1), s∗(t),Bi,Bj) (3)
In the case of multiple equilibria at time t, the play-
ers coordinate and choose the one that maximizes their
social welfare. The game is played in a similar way at
successive time instants, each time taking into account
the players’ decisions from previous time instants.
We are interested in different properties for the play-
ers’ equilibria decisions. Social optimality of the equi-
librium at some time t captures whether the decisions
at equilibrium maximize the social welfare, an outcome
that is desirable. A player’s utility is maximized for the
equilibrium decisions at t if his utility at t cannot be
improved with a different strategy of either of the play-
ers. We consider both the proportion of time instants
for which the equilibria decisions are socially optimal,
and the proportion of time instants for which the equi-
libria decisions maximize each player’s utility. Note that
social optimality is defined only at time instants where
both players play the game.
4 Survey
Our user model includes a number of parameters in the
expression of the utility function that drives the users’
strategic behaviors. As such, these parameters charac-
terize the users’ sharing behaviors; in practice, they vary
from one user to another. In order to obtain realistic
values for these, and to study the general trend and the
variability across users, we conduct a survey of Fb users.
4.1 Methodology
Through the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform, we
recruited participants with a Human Intelligence Task
(HIT) approval rate of at least 95%, at least 100 past
approved HITs and an active Facebook account. After
the standard demographic questions (Part I), we polled
the participants about their preferences regarding the
posts they share or view on OSNs (Part II). The second
part of the survey was composed of three questions to
assess the participants’ preferences regarding, respec-
tively, (1) sharing vs. viewing posts with location in-
formation (i.e., check-in posts), (2) sharing posts with
location information vs. sharing posts with co-location
information, and (3) location privacy vs. benefits of
sharing location information. We designed these three
questions through a rigorous full-profile conjoint anal-
ysis approach [20] and making use of a dedicated tool
([66]). This approach enables us to quantify individual
values for each of the participants’ preferences factors.
Sharing vs. Viewing (fsv). The participants were
told that, for technical reasons, some of their two most-
recent check-in posts and some of their friends’ two
most-recent check-in posts might be removed from Face-
book. Then, the participants were asked to rank by pref-
erence a number of scenarios corresponding to different
combinations of the numbers of posts kept (e.g., “two
of your recent posts are kept and one of your friend’s
recent posts is kept”, “none of your recent posts is kept
and one of your friend’s recent posts is kept”). The par-
ticipants were asked to take into account only benefit
considerations (i.e., not privacy). In order to limit the
bias coming from the content of the posts, we explicitly
mentioned that the posts to which we refer are posts
they once shared and, hence, would like to keep, and
we did not include the content of the participants’ ac-
tual posts in the survey page. The initial ordering of
these options was randomized. For this question, two at-
tributes were used: the number of the participant’s own
kept check-in posts and the number of the participant’s
friends’ kept check-in posts. Each attribute had three
possible values (i.e., none, one or two). This yielded an
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optimal number of five options to rank (out of a total
of nine). To detect sloppy answers, we included in the
list of options a sixth option in which no posts are re-
moved, and we explicitly stated in the text of the ques-
tion that this should be the preferred option. The rank-
ing provided by the users enabled us to compute their
preference factors 0 ≤ fsv ≤ 1, from the importance val-
ues attributed to each attribute: fsv is the normalized
importance value of the attribute own posts, whereas
1 − fsv is the normalized importance value of the at-
tribute friends’ posts. A value greater than 0.5 denotes
a preference for sharing over viewing information.
Location vs. Co-location (flc). This question was de-
signed using the same methodology as for the first ques-
tion: After a brief reminder about what a co-location
post is (illustrated with screenshots), the participants
were asked to order, according to their preferences, six
options in which a number of their own recent posts
with location information and a number of their own
recent posts with co-location information would be re-
moved (e.g., “two of your recent check-in posts are kept
and one of your recent co-location posts is kept.”). The
ranking provided by the users enabled us to compute
their preference factors flc, similarly to fsv.
Location Privacy vs. Sharing Benefits (fpb). After
a brief reminder about location privacy, the participants
were asked to order, according to preference, six options
with different numbers of check-in posts and the corre-
sponding levels of location-privacy, in terms of the aver-
age precision with which their location can be inferred
during a day (e.g., “12 location posts for an average
location privacy of 400 m”). These numbers were ex-
tracted from the experimental results presented in [41].
The ranking provided by the users enabled us to com-
pute their preference factors fpb, similarly to fsv.
Finally (Part III), we polled the participants about
their usage of Facebook, their privacy concerns, and
about their knowledge of the privacy threats related to
(co)-location information.
It took approximately ten minutes to complete the
survey; the participants were paid $2. We ruled out the
participants with inconsistent responses in Part II. More
specifically, we considered as inconsistent a ranking that
violates the natural order, i.e., considering that remov-
ing some of the existing posts is preferable to keeping
them all. In the end, we obtained a sample of N = 250
valid participants; the sample was diverse and balanced
in terms of the participants’ demographics: 46% of the
participants were female, the participants had various
primary areas of employments, and their ages ranged
from 19 to 68 years old, with an average of 33 and a
standard deviation of 9.48. The participants were ac-
tive Facebook users: 70% of the participants declared
that they use Facebook multiple times per day (93% do
so multiple times per week), 30% of them make at least
one post with location information per week, and 37%
of them make at least one post with co-location infor-
mation (in statuses, in posts or in pictures) per week.
Estimation of the Model’s Parameters. We
estimate the parameters in our model (α, bsl(t), bsc(t),
bvl(t) and bvc(t)) from the survey data. As we wanted
to keep the number of questions low, we quantified only
three preference factors fpb, flc and fsv; to estimate the
model’s parameters from these, we make a few assump-
tions: We assume that (1) the users’ preferences between
sharing and viewing is the same for posts with location
information as for posts with co-location information,
(2) the users’ preferences between posts with location
information and posts with co-location information is
the same for the users’ own posts as for their friends’
posts, (3) the users’ benefits of sharing/viewing are the
same over time. We derive the values of the model
parameters as follows: α = fpb, bsc(t) = fsv1−fsv bvc(t),
bvl(t) = flc1−flc bvc(t), bsl(t) =
fsv
1−fsv ·
flc
1−flc bvc(t) where
bvc(t) is a free variable (we set it to 1).
4.2 Results
We extracted the aforementioned three preference fac-
tors from the survey data by using XLSTAT. Note that,
due to the fact that only a limited number of scenarios
can be presented to the participants for ordering, the
preference factors can take only a limited number of
values. Table 1 in the Appendix presents relevant statis-
tics (e.g., mean and standard deviation) and Figure 1
illustrates the CDFs of the derived preference factors.
We observe that the average of the factors is close (yet
slightly higher) than 0.5 (specifically, .57± .15, .56± .15
and .60 ± .39 for fsv, flc and fpb, respectively). This
means that there is no strong consensus among the par-
ticipants regarding their preferences. In fact, the distri-
butions of the factor values are bi-modal: Users tend
to have a clear preference for one of the two options
(e.g., location vs. co-location). This phenomenon ap-
pears clearly for fpb (i.e., privacy vs. benefits) that has
a high standard deviation (0.39). In the case of fsv, for
instance, the proportion of indifferent users (for whom
fsv = 0.5) is substantial (16.8%) and almost as large as
the proportion of users who prefer viewing over sharing
(23.2%). These results are in line with those of previ-
ous studies that showed that there exist multiple usage
profiles on social networks: Some users connect to so-
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Fig. 1. CDFs of the preference factors of our survey participants.
cial networks mostly to share news with their friends
whereas others do so mostly to view news about their
friends [7, 43]. 54% of the users prefer location to co-
location information (flc > 0.5) and 20% do not have a
preference (flc = 0.5), whereas 63.2% favor privacy over
social benefits (fpb > 0.5).
As for the questions related to privacy issues on
Facebook, 24.8% of the participants declared being
“very concerned” about privacy, 50% declared be-
ing “moderately concerned” and 25.2% not concerned.
When the participants report being co-located with a
friend (say Bob), their feared adversaries are Bob’s
friends who are not friends with the participant (i.e., the
FF model, 44% of the participants), the common friends
of Bob and the participant (i.e., the CF model, 24.4%),
Facebook (i.e., the SP model, 24.4%) and the partici-
pants’ friends who are not friends with Bob (i.e., the MF
model, 21.2%); 26% of the participants reported not be-
ing concerned by any of these adversaries. 42.4% of the
participants were not aware that their friends’ posts that
include location or co-location information can decrease
their own location privacy. Only 50% of the participants
declared being aware that their posts have privacy im-
plications for themselves and for their friends, whereas
30.8% of the participants were not aware that their posts
have any effect on privacy (as illustrated in Figure 9).
Finally, we asked the participants whether the survey
would affect their future sharing behavior on Facebook:
A substantial fraction of the participants (around 35%)
declared they would be more careful, especially for co-
location information, for instance, by preventing their
friends from tagging them in posts: e.g., “I may remove
tags or ask friends not to tag me with locations in the
future.” (female, 35), “I may think twice before check-
ing in, or at least consider the impact tagging others
has on their privacy.” (male, 31 y/o), “Yes because I
was unaware of this issue and it now makes me a little
scared.” (male, 19 y/o). Of the participants who stated
that their behavior would not change, 31% declared
already being careful with their posts and tags. The
full transcript of our survey, as well as an anonymized
and sanitized version of the answers (part II and some
of part III, password FbS250 ) are available at https:
//infoscience.epfl.ch/record/218755?&ln=en.
5 Evaluation
We evaluate our framework by simulating and analyzing
the users’ decisions in different experimental setups.
5.1 Quantification of the Users’ Privacy
We quantify users’ privacy (P (·)) by relying on the in-
ference framework proposed by Olteanu et al. [41]; we
re-use the corresponding formalism and software library.
There are, to the best of our knowledge, no reference
scales for evaluating user perception of location privacy
values expressed in meters. Note that our model is flex-
ible enough to enable the use of other frameworks for
inferring location privacy, for instance, that proposed
by Xu et al. [67]. In short, we assume discrete loca-
tions (i.e., the geographical area of interest is parti-
tioned into cells by using a regular square grid; when
reporting their locations, users report the cells in which
their actual locations fall; and the adversary has ac-
cess to the users’ mobility profiles in the form of tran-
sition probabilities between cells). Privacy is computed
as the adversary’s expected error when localizing users,
using a junction tree exact-inference algorithm on the
Bayesian network [27] that models the probabilistic de-
pendencies between all the users’ locations over the time
period of interest. The location and co-location disclo-
sures available to the adversary depend on the consid-
ered adversary, among those presented in Section 3.2,
namely the SP, MF, FF, and CF models, and on the
users’ strategic decisions. For the sake of simplicity, we
consider the same adversary for both users: For exam-
ple, if the first user’s location privacy is computed with
respect to the OSN service provider, so is that of the
other user. At time instances where a user’s actual lo-
cation is not known (sparse data), her privacy cannot be
evaluated. At each other time instant t, the adversary
considers all past location and co-location posts from
the users when inferring their locations.
5.2 Scenarios
In order to evaluate our framework and to gain insight
about the effects of the different parameters, we first
consider the canonical meeting scenario, illustrated
in Figure 7 of the appendix: Two users, Alice and Bob,
coming from distinct locations (t = 1), meet for some
time (one time unit, t = 2), and later separate in dis-
tinct directions (t > 2). We consider T = 5 time instants
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in total. At each time instant, both Alice and Bob can
either report or hide their actual location. Additionally,
at t = 2, either of them can choose to report being co-
located with the other. Both users estimate the mobil-
ity profiles that an adversary would use in the inference
process (i.e., Bi,Bj) by a very basic one: In one time
unit, Alice/Bob either stays in the cell she/he is in (with
probability .5) or moves to one of the neighboring cells
(with the remaining equal probabilities). We assume,
for simplicity, a Manhattan-like model where users can
move vertically or horizontally. Note that, other than
from a velocity point of view (a user cannot move fur-
ther than one cell in one time instant), this captures no
real mobility information (all locations are equally prob-
able). The rationale behind this choice is to understand
the basics of the interplay between the users, indepen-
dently from the specifics and the singularities of their
individual data. The canonical scenario is, to some ex-
tent, also representative for an incomplete information
game model, where users naively estimate the adversar-
ial background information.
Additionally, we consider a real-dataset scenario,
using the Geolife dataset [72] (collected in 2008) and the
same co-location generation, user mobility profiles con-
struction and space and time discretization as Olteanu
et al. [41] (25 geographic regions covering the campus of
Tsinghua University in Beijing and one-hour time sub-
intervals splits of the continuous time interval). In this
scenario, two users, Alice and Bob, follow their individ-
ual actual location traces (we consider sub-samples of
T = 300 time instants from their full traces). At each
time instant, both Alice and Bob can either report or
hide their actual location (if this is known). Addition-
ally, if co-located, they can also choose to report their
co-location. In the privacy computation, mobility pro-
files constructed from real users’ full location traces are
used. Note that these are different and no longer uniform
(among locations) and that they illustrate user-specific
patterns of movement.
5.3 Experimental Results
In order to understand the effect of each of our model’s
parameters, we study, through simulations, the different
strategic decisions players choose in several situations.
We start with the canonical scenario, then move on to
the real-dataset scenario.
5.3.1 The Effect of the Considered Privacy Adversary
In a first experiment, we consider a homogeneous canon-
ical meeting scenario, where the parameters in both the
users’ utility are set using the average values of fsv, flc
and fpb obtained in our survey, as presented in Table 1
in the Appendix. Figure 2 illustrates the different game
outcomes, for the four adversarial models we presented
in Section 3.2. A first observation is that the players’
decisions are quite diverse, thus demonstrating that the
adversarial model can influence what players share.
In the SP and CF models (Figures 2a and 2b),
at t = 1 (when no co-location has yet been reported
and thus there is no correlation between the users’ lo-
cations or their privacy), the equilibrium decisions are
that nothing be shared – the first blue rectangle and red
circle pair. Note that for all time instants where users
are not co-located (t 6= 2), the equilibrium decisions can
only be "share nothing" or "share location". The equilib-
rium at t = 1 maximizes social welfare (there is a green
triangle for t = 1), but either of the players would have a
higher utility (both the blue rectangle and the red circle
are empty) if the other one shared his own location (be-
cause, in the current absence of correlation, they would
enjoy viewing where their friend is without any privacy
cost to themselves). However, such an outcome is not
an equilibrium because neither of them wants to share
their location at this time (mainly due to the fact that
the social benefit gained by sharing location would be
less than their incurred privacy loss, weighted by 1− α
and α, respectively). At time t = 2, when the players
are co-located, the additional benefit of sharing a co-
location along with the benefit of sharing a location,
overcomes the privacy loss; and the players’ equilibrium
decisions are that everything be shared (LC,LC). This
equilibrium not only maximizes social welfare, but also
gives the best utility for both of the players at this time.
Once these decisions to share have been made at t = 2,
the privacy at t = 3 is already substantially compro-
mised; hence the benefit of sharing location overcomes
the (now) small relative privacy loss and both players
choose to share everything, that is, their own locations.
Similarly, the decision to share a location at t = 3 affects
a player’s privacy at t = 4 severely enough that they
again decide to share their location (for the benefits)
and this effect propagates at successive time instants.
In the MF model (Figure 2c), there is a different
equilibrium at the time of co-location, t = 2. The out-
come where both players share everything, (LC,LC) is
still the one that maximizes social welfare, but it is no
longer an equilibrium because, to achieve better pri-
vacy, each of the players can now deviate from it by
not sharing their own location. Hence utility (e.g., out-
come (LC, L¯C) would be better for Bob than outcome
(LC,LC), because his adversary – his friends who are
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Fig. 2. Players’ decisions at equilibrium,
(
s∗Alice(t), s
∗
Bob(t)
)
, for fsv = 0.57, flc = 0.56, fpb = 0.60 and different adversarial models:
(a) Service Provider (SP), (b) Our friends in common (CF), (c) My other friends (MF), (d) My friend’s other friends (FF) models.
The x axis shows the time window of interest. On the y axis, for every time instant, Alice’s decision is represented by a blue rectangle
and Bob’s decision by a red circle. A player’s corresponding shape is full if its utility at equilibrium is maximized, and empty otherwise.
Additionally, each time instant is marked by a green triangle, if the equilibrium decisions maximize social welfare.
not Alice’s friends – cannot see that Alice also shares
her location). This was not the case in the SP model,
where information shared by either player is automati-
cally seen by the provider. In this case, the equilibrium
is outcome (L¯C, L¯C): Sharing only a co-location does
come with a small privacy cost (privacy can decrease
even when only co-location and no location information
is available due to the mobility profiles, as demonstrated
in [41]), but this loss is smaller than the benefit gained
by sharing. This equilibrium maximizes neither the so-
cial welfare nor a player’s utility (either of them would
have a better utility if the other would share their loca-
tion, because they enjoy viewing where their friend is,
at no privacy cost to themselves). At time t = 3, the
players’ privacy is higher than it was in the SP and CF
models, for any strategy profile, because the decisions
made at t = 2 provide the adversary with less infor-
mation. Sharing the location is not justified because, in
this case, the privacy cost this would bring is higher
than the benefit gain, hence the equilibrium decisions
are that nothing be shared. This equilibrium does not
maximize players’ utilities (each would still prefer to see
the other’s location at no privacy cost) or the social wel-
fare. This effect is propagated over time, at successive
time instants, and the equilibria decisions are the same:
that nothing be shared. Furthermore, as the effect of
the reported co-location at time t = 2 fades away over
time, privacy increases, and at t = 5 the equilibrium
also maximizes social welfare.
Finally, in the FF model (Figure 2d), the equilib-
rium at times when the players are not co-located is al-
ways (LC¯, LC¯): Sharing their own location brings them
some social benefits without any privacy costs (this ad-
versary cannot see if they share location). When players
are co-located, the equilibrium is (LC¯, LC¯) and it max-
imizes both the social welfare and the players’ utilities.
5.3.2 The Effect of Privacy vs. Benefits Preferences
We present a heterogeneous canonical meeting scenario,
where players place different importance on privacy and
social benefits. We consider the average values for fsv
and flc and vary fpb in [0, 1]. Figure 3 illustrates our
results. We observe that, when players have different
values for fpb (recall that α = fpb), their interests can
be in conflict and their decisions at equilibrium might
differ: When co-located (t = 2), one player might share
only co-location, whereas the other shares both (e.g., in
the MF model when αAlice = 0.6 and αBob = 0.2 Bob
shares both, while Alice shares only co-location (recall
that "share co-location" and "share both" decisions can
only occur when the players are co-located, i.e., 20% of
the times) or one shares his location, whereas the other
shares nothing (e.g., in the MF model when αAlice = 1
and αBob = 0.2 Alice shares nothing, whereas Bob only
shares his location).
An interesting observation is that, in the SP model,
when the two players are co-located, the equilibria
strategies are always in the form of (L¯C¯, L¯C¯), (L¯C, L¯C)
or (LC,LC). This stems from the fact that if one player
wants to share the co-location information, as the ser-
vice provider automatically has access to it, the privacy
of the other player is already compromised and he is
forced into sharing also but at least obtains the asso-
ciated social benefits. This leads to equilibria in which
one player’s utility, or even the social welfare, is not
maximized. Such outcomes can be avoided in the other
models, where a player can undo the co-location shared
by the other, and only equilibria with strategies where
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Fig. 3. Players’ decisions at equilibrium, aggregated over time for fsv = 0.57, flc = 0.56, and different adversarial models: Service
Provider (SP)–first row, Our friends in common (CF)–second row, My other friends (MF)–third row, My friend’s other friends (FF)–
forth row models. For each adversarial model and each possible combination of values for αAlice and αBob, eight heatmaps (left four
for Alice, right four for Bob) indicate the percentage of times, aggregated over the number of time instants, that a player made one
of the four possible decisions: "share nothing", "share location", "share co-location" or "share both" (in all combinations αAlice-αBob,
the values of the four cells for a player sum to 100). We highlight with rectangles the cases that we discuss in Section 5.3.2.
both players share or do not share the co-location in-
formation are permitted. An example can be observed
in Figure 3, for αAlice = 0.8 and αBob = 0.2: In the SP
model, Alice is forced into sharing her location and co-
location information at t = 2 because Bob, who places
little importance on privacy, shares both, and the equi-
librium is (LC,LC); in the CF model, Alice does not al-
low Bob to post co-location information about her and
the equilibrium in this case becomes (L¯C¯, LC¯): that Al-
ice shares nothing while Bob only shares his location.
Another observation is that, in all adversarial
models, both players tend to share more as one or
both their α decreases (i.e., as one or both value pri-
vacy less). Notably, a player’s strategy can change, even
when only his friend’s preferences change. For example,
in the average case of αAlice = 0.6: As αBob decreases
from 1 to 0, the amount of sharing Alice does increases
(e.g., in the FF model, Alice only shares her location
when αBob ∈ [0.2, 1], but she also shares the co-location
when αBob = 0). The same observation holds for the
other values of αAlice. For the SP model, in particular,
when Alice is very privacy conscious (αAlice = 1), her
preferred outcome when co-located would be to share
nothing, but she can only do this when αBob = 1.
She can gradually be forced into sharing her co-location
with Bob (when αBob ∈ [0.6, 0.8]) or even their co-
location and her location (when αBob ≤ 0.4). Further-
more, the propagation of this effect can be observed not
only at times where the players are co-located. Let us
look, for example, at the case where αAlice = 0.2 and
αBob = 0.6: In the CF model, before his co-location
with Alice (at t = 1 - a detail that is not directly read-
able form Figure 3, as it presents statistics aggregated
over time instants), Bob decides to not share anything
(20% of the times). Once co-located, Bob and Alice have
enough incentive to share both their co-location and lo-
cation (20% of the times). After their co-location, Alice
still has incentive to share her location. Their previously
reported co-location, as well as Alice’s successive reports
of her location, continue to damage Bob’s privacy, and
he counteracts these losses by also sharing his location
for the benefits (60% of the times).
5.3.3 The Effects of Multiple Users’ Preferences
We present a more realistic setup, based on the canon-
ical meeting scenario. Each of the two players’ parame-
ters are assigned from the individual preference profiles
of the survey participants. A preference profile repre-
sents the values of all preference factors (fsv, flc, fpb),
for a specific participant; there are 250 such profiles.
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Fig. 4. Equilibria decisions (top row) and their properties (bot-
tom row), when Alice and Bob have different preference profiles,
corresponding to real survey data: 92 benefits-oriented profiles
(fpb < 0.5) and 158 privacy-oriented profiles (fpb > 0.5). We
present three scenarios: both Alice and Bob are benefits-oriented
(left plots), Alice is benefits-oriented and Bob is privacy-oriented
(middle plots) and both are privacy-oriented (right plots). Differ-
ent adversarial models (SP, CF, MF, FF) are illustrated on the x
axis. In each of the top three plots, for each adversarial model,
two bars (left blue for Alice and right red for Bob) indicate–on
the y axis–the proportion of times (aggregated over time instants
and the number of preference profile pairs considered in that
scenario) a player made one of the four decisions: share nothing
(empty pattern), share only location (hash right pattern), share
only co-location (hash left pattern) or share both (hash right-left
pattern). Each of the three bottom plots show, on the y axis, for
each adversarial model, the proportion of times social welfare and
individual utilities are maximized.
Analyzing the players’ behaviors is substantially more
complicated, due to the multiple influences present in
such a complex setup. In order to find a meaningful in-
terpretation, we alternatively split the 250 preference
profiles into two subsets, based on the value of one of
the preference factors. We present results on how play-
ers having different values for the fsv preference factor
affects their decisions in the appendix.
The Case of Benefits-Oriented / Privacy-
Oriented Players. We present the case where the
players have different values for the fpb factor. We se-
lect two subsets of preference profiles from our survey
data: (1) the privacy-oriented (158 profiles), for which
fpb > 0.5; and (2) the benefits-oriented (92 profiles),
for which fpb < 0.5. We evaluate the outcome of the
Sharing Game in three cases: (1) when Alice is privacy-
oriented and Bob is benefits-oriented, (2) when both
are privacy-oriented and (3) when both are benefits-
oriented, for each possible pairs of preference profiles.
Figure 4 illustrates our aggregated results (see caption
for details). It is interesting that, when both players
are benefits-oriented, the amount of shared co-location
is substantial: It is always shared in the SP, MF and
CF adversarial models (20% of all time instants), and
is shared approximately 19.7% of all time instants in
the FF model. To infer these numbers from Figure 4,
we sum the values for "co-location" and "both". As dis-
cussed in Section 5.3.2, in any adversarial model, both
players share the same amount of co-location. When
one player is benefits-oriented and the other is privacy-
oriented, the amount of shared co-location varies
significantly, with respect to the considered ad-
versary: It is always shared in the SP case, shared 5.4%
of all time instants (27% of the time instants when the
players are co-located) in the CF case, 10% of all time
instants in the MF case and only 2% of all time in-
stants in the FF case. One reason for this behavior is
that the CF adversary has access to location informa-
tion shared by both players, whereas the MF adversary
has access only to location shared by one of them, so
privacy losses stemming from shared co-locations are
higher in the CF case, thus less co-location information
is shared. It is interesting that this also causes both
players to share their location in the CF case
more frequently than in the MF case (in the CF
case, it is enough that one player share his location af-
ter a shared co-location, for both players’ privacy to be
damaged, so the other player would be forced to also
share his location for some benefit). When both players
are privacy-oriented, location sharing is substantially re-
duced, but co-location is still shared 15% of all time in-
stants in the SP case. The FF case illustrates a naturally
emerging countermeasure: In all the cases, players find
it most beneficial to report few co-locations (unlinking
themselves from their friend makes the information un-
available to the FF adversary) and report their location
most often (at no privacy cost). The equilibria decisions
are frequently socially optimal: From 45% of the times
(in the FF model, when Alice is benefits-oriented and
Bob is privacy-oriented) to 99% of the times (in the FF
model, when Alice and Bob are benefits-oriented). We
notice that the case of players having opposite views
regarding fpb is particularly problematic: Regardless of
the considered adversary, this case presents the least
amount of socially optimal equilibria decisions; further-
more, the utility of the benefits-oriented player is rarely
maximized because his opponent would seldom share or
allow sharing. Finally, misaligned preferences can lead
to different decisions for the players as they only make
the same decision 24% of the times in the SP model,
19.2% in the CF model and 11.6% in the MF model.
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Fig. 5. Possible strategies and equilibria decisions (CF adversarial model) when Alice and Bob use two random traces from the Geolife
dataset, for fsv = 0.57, flc = 0.56, fpb = 0.60. We illustrate the game outcome between Alice and Bob in two cases: %7 (top) and
10%(bottom) co-locations, respectively – the trace used by Alice is exactly the same in both cases. The x axis shows the entire time
window of interest. In the top section, on the y axis, the possible strategies at each time instant of the game are illustrated: Alice can
only share location (blue ’plus’), Bob can only share location (red ’cross’), Alice and Bob can both share location and co-location (vio-
let ’rhombus’); For time instants where the game cannot be played (missing location data) there is no symbol. The middle and bottom
sections of the y axis illustrate the equilibria decisions: For every time instant, Alice’s decision is represented by a blue rectangle and
Bob’s decision by a red circle; A player’s corresponding shape is full if its utility at equilibrium is maximized, and empty otherwise. Ad-
ditionally, each time instant at which both Alice and Bob can play is marked by an upward-pointing green triangle, if the equilibrium
decisions maximize social welfare or by a downward-pointing green rectangle if they do not.
5.3.4 The Effects of Real Location Traces
In this section, we describe results on our real dataset
scenario. We consider homogenous preference param-
eters in both the users’ utility and set these using the
average values of fsv, flc and fpb obtained in our survey,
as presented in Table 1 in the Appendix. For the users’
traces, we consider pairs of real traces (60 pairs of traces
consisting of 300 time instants) sampled by Olteanu et
al. [41] and the corresponding complex (and different)
mobility profiles (we refer to Section 7.1 of the article for
details). On these traces, users can report co-locations
(i.e., meet), on average, 14.6% of the time instants (first
quartile, median, third quartiles for the number of co-
locations are 10.67%, 12.83%, and 16.67% of the time
instants, respectively) and there are location samples at
37.55% of the time instants, on average. We simulate
the game between Alice and Bob, for all the 60 pairs of
traces, and twice for each of the pairs (s.t. each of the
two traces in a pair is attributed to the first player).
An Individual Snapshot. We first present two
randomly selected simulations of the game between Al-
ice and Bob, illustrated in Figure 5. We choose a trace
for Alice and two different traces for Bob; Alice’s trace
contains co-locations with that of Bob in 7% (Figure 5
top) and 10% (Figure 5 bottom) of the 300 time in-
stants, respectively. A first observation is that a vicious
circle effect is noticeable. After their first shared co-
location (t = 4), users’ behavior changes and they share
more than they had done before that co-location: Al-
ice shifts from not sharing anything at t = 1, 2, 3 to
sharing both location and co-location at t = 5 and Bob
from sharing only his location (t = 1, 3) to sharing both
(t = 5). We repeatedly observe that, after a shared co-
location, users continue to share. Specifically, in the first
case (Figure 5 top), after a co-location was shared by
either of the players, a player’s subsequent decision in-
volves sharing location (either only location, or both
location and co-location) 95% and 90% of the times, for
Alice and Bob, respectively. We consider only the time
instants where location is available. This frequency is
quite high, indeed higher than the frequency of decid-
ing to share their locations (when available) over the
entire traces: 68% and 81% of the time instants, respec-
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tively for Alice and for Bob. In the second case (Figure 5
bottom), the same effect is observed 91% and 88% of
the times, respectively. Again, this is higher than the
frequency of deciding to share their locations over the
whole traces: 76% and 86% of the time instants, respec-
tively. The oversharing effect can, occasionally,
be overcome at later time instants. This can hap-
pen when users did not share for some time (either be-
cause they did not meet or because their location data
is sparse) or when their location is particular (i.e., a
rarely visited location, which would yield a higher error
for the adversary, thus a higher privacy). Consequently,
both Alice and Bob occasionally decide not to share
anything (e.g., in Figure 5 top, Bob shares nothing at
t = 22, · · · ; Alice shares nothing at t = 65, 72, · · · ; At
t = 74, Bob shares nothing even though Alice shares
her location and, immediately after, at t = 75, the situa-
tion flips and Alice shares nothing, whereas Bob shares
his location; in Figure 5 bottom, at t = 162 both users
only share co-location. Overall, of the times a player’s
location is available and he decides to share it, 33%
and 21% in the first case (Figure 5 top), and 43% and
27% in the second case (Figure 5 bottom), respectively
for Alice and Bob, happen right after a co-location was
shared. To conclude, even though Alice’s location
data, mobility profile, and preferences are con-
stant, her behavior can change depending on the
friend with whom she interacts (even if he has
the same preferences as she has). Hence, the speci-
ficities of the data – the actual locations in the traces,
the density of the location data, the meeting frequency
(i.e., density of co-locations) and the patterns of the
meetings, as well as the quality of the users’ mobility
profiles – strongly affect the users’ sharing deci-
sions, even when they have the same preferences.
The Impact of Co-locations. We now present
the aggregated results of our simulations between all
the pairs of traces, illustrated in Figure 6. We split and
aggregate the results in two sets: those with traces that
contain fewer co-locations than the median value for the
entire dataset (12.83%) and those that contain more.
We notice an incentive to over-share co-locations
and locations: In the second case, where Alice and
Bob have more co-locations, they both share more loca-
tions and more co-locations, in all adversarial models.
For example, in the CF model, if in the first scenario
Alice shares co-location and location 9.8% and 25.8%
of the time instants, respectively, in the second one she
shares co-location and location 18.8% (representing a
relative increase of 87.8%) and 31.3% (representing a
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Fig. 6. Equilibria decisions when Alice and Bob use traces from
the Geolife dataset, for fsv = 0.57, flc = 0.56, fpb = 0.60. We
present two scenarios, depending on the number of co-locations
they share: (a) # co-locations lower than the median and (b) #
co-locations higher than the median. Different adversarial models
(SP, CF, MF, FF) are illustrated on the x axis. For each adversar-
ial model, two bars (left for Alice and right for Bob) indicate–on
the y axis–the proportion of times (aggregated over the num-
ber of time instants and the number of runs considered in that
scenario) a player made one of the four decisions: share nothing
(empty pattern), share only location (hash right pattern), share
only co-location (hash left pattern) or share both (hash right-left
pattern); The fact that a player cannot share anything (i.e., miss-
ing location data) is illustrated by the solid pattern. The arrows
represent, in each scenario, the average number of co-locations.
relative increase of 21.7%) of the times, respectively. Fi-
nally, on this dataset, the average users (in terms of
their privacy preferences) would often choose to share
some information. This can be attributed to the rel-
atively high number of co-locations in the dataset, as
well as to the quality of the mobility profiles.
5.4 Experimental Conclusions
In the canonical meeting scenario, which abstracts the
specificities of the data, we exposed the fact that the
users’ different preferences factors lead to com-
plexity in their interactions. We noted in the real
dataset scenario that the users’ equilibria decisions
are also highly data dependent: The users’ actual
traces, as well as the quality of their mobility pro-
files, can greatly influence users’ sharing decisions, even
when they agree in terms of their preference fac-
tors. It is not hard to imagine how much more complex
the interactions between the users can become when dif-
ferent preference factors of the users are taken into ac-
count along with real (co-)location data. Understanding
them is not a trivial problem and it is hard to draw gen-
erally applicable and quantifiable conclusions that take
all these variations into account. We exposed, however,
a few trends that we believe to be interesting. First, we
identified the model parameters and the data specifici-
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ties that have the strongest effect on the users’ decisions:
the frequency of co-locations, the quality of the users’
mobility profiles, the considered adversary, the value of
α (fpb, the preference for privacy versus social bene-
fits of one user); whereas other model parameters have
a more moderate effect. Second, some interesting pat-
terns of behavior emerge, for instance, the fact that a
vicious-circle effect can occur in the SP adversarial
model: When a player (say Alice) has a strong incentive
to share, it is enough that she shares one co-location in-
formation and, with respect to the service provider, her
friend (Bob), who might not be willing to share at all,
will continue to have his privacy affected and be forced
into sharing his location at several later times as well.
This effect is propagated and stronger if Alice still wants
to share her own location at other time instants, further
damaging Bob’s privacy. We also observed that the ef-
fect of a shared co-location can (sometimes) eventually
fade away and that Bob, too, can influence Alice into
sharing; these effects can quickly alternate, making the
players’ decisions vary over time. In other words, the
privacy effects propagate not only in space (influences
from a friend) but also in time. Third, we noticed that,
in the FF model, a natural tendency is to share few co-
locations but the users still share a significant amount
of location information. Finally, we showed (e.g., in the
SP and CF models) that a (common) decision to share
co-location creates the incentive to over-share lo-
cations at later times after the co-location.
6 Extended Model
We now propose an extended model, relaxing the as-
sumptions of selfishness, privacy-myopia and complete
information for the players. We define the type of a
player i (denoted by θi(t)) as the information that is
private to her. This can include but is not limited to her
actual location (ai(t)), the background information that
the adversary has on her (Bi), her specific parameters
that influence the computation of her social benefits and
her privacy. Thus, θi(t) , (ai(t),Bi, fpb, flc, fsv, . . . ).We
assume that a player i has information only about the
possible domain and probability distributions of the
other player’s type and that she incorporates these into
her utility function in the form of an expected value.
Given θ(t) = (θi(t), θj(t)), the individual utility of
player i for some strategy profile s(t) at time t captures
both her social benefits and her privacy
uˆi (t,a(t),o(t− 1), s(t),Bi,Bj ,θ(t)) = (4)
(1− αi) ·Bi (t,a(t), s(t),θ(t)) +
αi · P (i, t,a(t),o(t− 1), s(t),Bi,Bj ,θ(t))
Thus, the expected individual utility of a player can
be computed as
u¯i (t,a(t),o(t− 1), s(t),Bi,Bj) =
Eθ(t)[uˆi (t,a(t),o(t− 1), s(t),Bi,Bj ,θ(t))] (5)
As previous studies have shown (e.g., [36]), in the
context of OSNs where users are friends, they might
take into account their friends’ individual utility hence
choose their strategy based on their perceived utility,
which we define for some strategy profile s(t) as follows
ui (t,a(t),o(t− 1), s(t),Bi,Bj) = (6)
u¯i (t,a(t),o(t− 1), s(t),Bi,Bj) +
Fi · u¯j (t,a(t),o(t− 1), s(t),Bi,Bj)
where Fi ∈ [0, 1] denotes the altruistic factor of user i
for the other user. These factors can be experimentally
measured using techniques based on conjoint analysis
(e.g., [45–47]). Furthermore, as current decisions have
privacy implications at future time instants, we consider
the cumulative utility of user i at time t as the dis-
counted sum of all perceived utilities from time t (the
present) until time T (the future) as follows
Ui (t,a(t),o(t− 1), s(t),Bi,Bj) = (7)
Ea[t+1,···,T ]
[
T∑
t′=t
δt
′−t · ui
(
t′,a(t′),o(t′−1), s(t′),Bi,Bj
)]
where δ is a discount factor, taking values in the interval
[0, 1] and a[t + 1, · · · , T ] denotes the vector of actual
locations at times t+1, · · · , T for both i and j. Note that,
in computing her cumulated utility at time t, a user does
not know any of the actual locations in the future (t′ >
t), hence the expectation value over a[t+1, · · · , T ]. Given
these locations, s(t′) can be deterministically predicted.
At every time instant, we model the interactions as
an incomplete information, extensive-form game (where
the players observe each other’s strategies). Solving such
an extended game is not straightforward. Intuitively,
players could choose the strategy that maximizes their
expected utility with respect to the unknown informa-
tion (i.e., the other player’s type). However, the way
in which players choose to estimate and use the un-
known information (in the backward induction algo-
rithm) strongly affects the complexity of the game. We
plan to study the different possibilities and give a nu-
merical solution in future work.
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7 Discussion and Limitations
This work represents the first step towards modeling the
interplay between users in the context of (co-)location
sharing and the idea of combining a game-theoretic
model with real-user parameters in this setting is also
novel. For the first attempt to tackle the problem of
understanding users’ interaction in such a complex con-
text, we focused on a number of specific scenarios and
assumptions, that open interesting directions for fu-
ture work. We assumed that players do not report
fake co-locations. Including fake co-locations into the
model is straightforward and simply increases the num-
ber of possible strategies at times where players are
not co-located. However, the benefit of sharing fake co-
locations is likely different than that of sharing true co-
locations. We included, in our evaluation, privacy with
respect to one adversary. As a user is likely sensitive
to various adversaries, a combination of these differ-
ent adversaries can be included in the utility function.
We considered a game with two players. In doing so,
we illustrated interdependence effects that work both
in time (actions at previous times influence a user’s
future decisions for sharing) and in space (actions of
a friend influence a user’s decisions). To better illus-
trate the spacial effects, the framework can be extended
to more players and non-default visibility settings for
posts; intuitively, we expect that the cascading effect
(one user’s behavior affecting that of her friends’, that
of the friends of her friends, and so on and so forth)
would occur, with an even greater impact with more
players. We plan to study the N -player T -time Sharing
Game, by using multi-agent influence diagrams intro-
duced by Koller et al. [28]. Our evaluation focused on
a few specific cases and maintained the number of free
parameters low. We quantified only a limited number of
preference factors (whose values could be specific to Fb
users) in order to avoid the questionnaire fatigue effect
that would have decreased the quality of the partici-
pants’ responses. More preference factors can be evalu-
ated through similar user surveys (e.g., different values
for fpb for the different adversarial models and their re-
spective weights in the utility function; the benefit users
gain for sharing fake co-locations). Furthermore, previ-
ous works (e.g., [3, 26]) have shown that user (reported)
privacy attitudes do not always correspond to actual be-
haviors, the vast majority of Mechanical Turk workers is
reported to be US-based [53] and we have demonstrated
that users decisions are highly data dependent. Thus,
our results should be taken with a grain of salt: We be-
lieve that the trends that we have exposed are generic,
but their magnitude will likely differ on other datasets
or when considering different user privacy preferences.
Ultimately, our extensible model with quantifiable pa-
rameters can serve as the first building block to assist
user decision-making in an informed manner. Specifi-
cally, we envision that a software tool would use our
framework to take these interactions into account and
to assist users in improving their awareness and deci-
sions.
8 Conclusion
It is well-known that the behavior of others affects our
own privacy, in particular in the case of interdependent
data. Yet, formalizing these complex interdependences
and their implications is non-trivial, especially because
human decisions play a dominant role. To address this
issue, we focused on the (co-)location sharing features
provided by major OSNs. We proposed a coarse-grained
game-theoretic model and provided a first framework to
study the interplay between two friends. A major chal-
lenge in such approaches is to assign meaningful values
to the parameters that characterize user preferences. For
this purpose, we carried out a survey of Facebook users,
which also confirmed the anticipated high diversity of
opinions in terms of social benefits and location privacy.
We studied the resulting equilibria and their properties,
in different settings. In particular, we showed how, be-
cause of conflicting preferences, one of the users can be
forced into a situation that she does not desire (e.g., we
exemplified on a mobility dataset how a vicious-circle
effect emerges) and we demonstrated that sharing co-
location information can additionally encourage users to
over-share their locations. This is an interesting finding
from a design perspective for the OSN service providers
but a dangerous one for the end users: Advertising fea-
tures that permit the sharing of co-location information
could also encourage users to share their locations more
often. Furthermore, we showed that user’s decisions are
strongly influenced by the adversary that they consider
and dependent on the mobility data. We emphasized
the need to develop warning mechanisms for the users
to help them better understand and anticipate the con-
sequences of their (co-)location sharing decisions.
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9 Appendix
Fig. 7. Canonical meeting scenario: Two users, Alice (dotted) and
Bob (dashed), coming from distinct directions, meet for some
time, and later separate in distinct directions.
9.1 The Case of Sharer / Viewer Players
We study how the fact that the players have differ-
ent values for the fsv preference factor affects their de-
cisions, on the canonical meeting scenario (illustrated
in Figure 7). We select two subsets of preference pro-
files from our survey data: the sharers (150 profiles)–for
which fsv > 0.5–and the viewers (58 profiles)–for which
fsv < 0.5. We evaluate the outcome of the Sharing
Game in three cases, for each possible pairs of prefer-
ence profiles: when Alice has a sharer ’s preference pro-
file and Bob a viewer ’s, when both have sharers profiles
and when both have viewers profiles.
Figure 8 shows our aggregated results (see caption
for details). We note that the interplay between the var-
ious parameters of the preference profiles (e.g., a sharer
profile encourages sharing because fsv > 0.5, but it
could also discourage sharing if fpb > 0.5) results in
a large variety in the distribution of players’ equilibria
decisions. Despite this variability, a few trends are still
distinguishable. First, in general, a sharer shares more
information than a viewer and the most information is
shared when both Alice and Bob are sharers, whereas
the least information is shared when both are viewers.
Second, regardless of the players’ types (sharer/viewer),
and due to the forcing effect, the largest amount of co-
location is shared in the SP model (e.g., 17% of all
time instants when both players are sharers); the small-
est amount of co-location is shared in the FF model
(e.g., 3.6% of all time instants when both players are
viewers), when players find it most beneficial to report
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Fig. 8. Equilibria decisions (a) and their properties (b), when Al-
ice and Bob have different preference profiles, corresponding to
real survey data: 150 sharers’ profiles (fsv > 0.5) and 58 viewers’
profiles (fsv < 0.5). We present three scenarios: both Alice and
Bob are sharers (left plots), Alice is a sharer and Bob is a viewer
(middle plots) and both are viewers (right plots). Note that, due
to the symmetry of the trajectories in the meeting scenario, the
case where Alice is a viewer and Bob is a sharer is symmetric
to the case where Alice is a sharer and Bob is a viewer. Differ-
ent adversarial models (SP, CF, MF, FF) are illustrated on the x
axis. In each of the top three plots, for each adversarial model,
two bars (blue on the left for Alice and red on the right for Bob)
indicate–on the y axis–the proportion of times (aggregated over
time instants and the number of preference profile pairs consid-
ered in that scenario) a player made one of the four possible de-
cisions: share nothing (empty pattern), share only location (hash
right pattern), share only co-location (hash left pattern) or share
both (hash right-left pattern). Each of the three bottom plots
show, on the y axis, for each adversarial model, the proportion of
times social welfare and individual utilities are maximized.
few co-locations and report their location most often (at
no privacy cost). Furthermore, the equilibria decisions
are frequently socially-optimal: From 52% of the times
(in the FF model, when both Alice and Bob are viewers)
to 85% of the times (in the CF model, when both Alice
and Bob are sharers). Regardless of the adversary, the
most socially-optimal equilibria are reached when both
players are sharers and the least when both players are
viewers (due to the fact that a viewer player shares less
than a sharer player and, consequently, their opponent
benefits less from their posts).
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fsv flc fpb
avg. ± stddev. .57± .15 .56± .15 .60± .39
proportion of users with f∗ > 0.5 (prefer sharing/ location/ privacy) 60% 54% 63.2%
proportion of users with f∗ = 0.5 (indifferent) 16.8% 20% N/A
proportion of users with f∗ < 0.5 (prefer viewing/ co-location/ benefits) 23.2% 26% 36.8%
Table 1. User preference factors extracted from the survey. f∗ denotes, depending on the column, fsv , flc, or fpb.
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Fig. 9. (a) Users’ concern about location privacy; (b) The adversaries that users are concerned about: Our friends in common (CF),
My other friends (MF), My friend’s other friends (FF), The service provider (SP). Users’ awareness about (c) privacy risks stemming
from their own posts; (d) own privacy risks stemming from friends’ posts.
(a) MF (b) FF (c) CF
Fig. 10. Friends adversarial models (hashed area) for user i:
(a) My other friends model (MF); (b) My friend’s other friends
model (FF); (c) Our friends in common model (CF). The social
circle of user i (resp. j) is represented by the left (resp. right)
circle. The intersection represents the common friends of i and j.
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ai(t) Player i’s actual location at time t
aj(t) Player j’s actual location at time t
a(t) =
(
ai(t), aj(t)
)
The players’ actual locations at time t
si(t) = (sli(t), sci(t)) A possible strategy of player i at time t
L¯ or sl·(t) = 0 (False) Hide location
L or sl·(t) = 1 (True) Share location
C¯ or sc·(t) = 0 (False) Hide co-location
C or sc·(t) = 1 (True) Share co-location
s∗(t) =
(
s∗i (t), s∗j (t)
)
Equilibrium strategy profiles (decisions) at time t
αi Weight with which player i values privacy over benefits
Bi (t, a(t), s(t)) Player i’s benefits at time t for strategy profile s(t)
bisl Player i’s benefit of sharing her actual location at t
bivl Player i’s benefit of viewing her friend’s location at t
bisc Player i’s benefit of sharing co-location with a friend at t
bivc Player i’s benefit of viewing co-loc. shared by a friend at t
f isv Player i’s preference factor: sharing vs. viewing
f ilc Player i’s preference factor: location vs. co-location
f ipb Player i’s preference factor: privacy vs. benefits
Fi The altruistic factor of player i for the other player
o(t) Information observed by the adversary in the time window up to t
Bi
The adversary’s background knowledge about player i
(e.g., her mobility profile)
P
(
i, t, a(t), o(t− 1), s(t),Bi,Bj
)
Player i’s privacy at time t for some strategy profile s(t)
θi(t)
Player i’s type at time t (includes actual location, benefits vs.
privacy preferences, · · · )
uˆi
(
t, a(t), o(t− 1), s(t),Bi,Bj , θ(t)
) Player i’s individual utility at time t for strategy profile s(t)
and player types θ(t)
u¯i
(
t, a(t), o(t− 1), s(t),Bi,Bj
)
Player i’s expected individual utility at t for strategy profile s(t)
ui
(
t, a(t), o(t− 1), s(t),Bi,Bj
) Player i’s perceived utility at time t for strategy profile s(t)
(includes altruism)
Ui
(
t, a(t), o(t− 1), s(t),Bi,Bj
) Player i’s utility/cumulative utility (includes future considerations)
at time t for strategy profile s(t)
δ Discount factor for future considerations in the cumulated utility
SW (t, si(t), sj(t)) Social welfare at time t for strategy profile (si(t), sj(t))
Table 2. Table of notations.
